Sweden's new multi-pillar pension system includes a system of mandatory fully-funded individual accounts. The Swedish system tries to keep administrative costs down through centralized management of the collection of contributions, switching among fund options, and record-keeping and communication with account holders.
or should there be a more flexible set of payo ut options? How should retirees be protected from fluctuations in annuity prices that can arise in private annuity markets? Should annuity providers be able to charge higher prices to women than to men for annuities of equal value because women live longer on average? Should funds in individual accounts be inheritable?
As the debate on Social Security reform continues, much can be learned from the experience of Sweden, which added an individual accounts tier to its public pension system in the late 1990s. The Swedish system, called the premium pension, is quite distinctive in its design: 2.5 percent of payroll is deposited into an account managed by a fund manager chosen by employees from a list of funds approved by the new Premium Pension Authority (Premiepensionsmyndigheten, or PPM) . In the initial round of sign-ups, workers could choose from 465 approved funds listed in PPM's fund catalogue, and were allowed to place their contributions into up to five different funds.
The new pension system that Sweden put in place in the late 1990s offers a possible model for a mandatory individual accounts pension tier that combines cost-lowering centralized administration with a very wide range of fund choice for individual contributors. This paper examines the Swedish experience and lessons it suggests about design and implementation challenges that are likely to arise in such a system.
BACKGROUND TO REFORM
Sweden has one of the oldest and most comprehensive public pension systems in the world. The state is clearly the dominant pension provider: in 1991, Swedes aged 66 and above received an average of 84.1 percent of their pension income from the state pension system, compared to only 13.5 percent from an occupational pension and 2.3 percent from a private pension. 2 The pension system is the largest government spending program. Pension spending increased from 4.3 % of GDP in 1965 to 12.2 % in 1992.
Prior to reforms enacted in the 1990s, Sweden's pension system consisted of a flat-rate basic pension and the national supplementary earning-related pension (ATP). The universal flatrate tier operated on a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) basis, while the earnings-related tier was partially pre-funded. Both tiers were financed largely by earmarked employer contributions. For retirees with few or no ATP pension credits, the basic pension system provided a flat-rate benefit while the ATP system provided income-related pensions calculated according to "defined benefit" principles. The system was designed so that the earnings-related pension would provide an average production worker with a replacement rate of 60 percent of income for the best 15 years of at least 30 years of labor market participation. Those above the system's benefit and contribution ceiling received no additional benefits for those earnings. 3 In addition to the flatrate basic pension and earnings-related pension, a pension supplement equal to roughly half of the basic pension was available to individuals whose earnings-related benefits were very low.
The pens ion supplement provided an income floor that, in combination with the other two tiers, moved almost all seniors in Sweden above poverty.
2 Men received an average of 82 percent of their pension from the state pension system, while women got 86.9 percent of their (lower) pensions from the state. The Swedish public pension system enjoyed widespread popularity. By the 1980s, however, several problems with the system were becoming evident, including increasing funding deficits in both the universal and earnings-related (ATP) pension tiers, a low (and price-indexed) benefit ceiling in the earnings-related pension that was gradually compressing benefits as real earnings rose, and a benefit structure that disproportionately benefited workers with rising earnings profiles and relatively short work histories because it was based on the best fifteen years of earnings. 4 Critics of the Swedish welfare state, notably the Swedish Employer's Federation, also criticized the pension system as part of an overall welfare state that harmed Swedish competitiveness through very high payroll taxes, 5 lowered national savings, and reduced work incentives, especially for older workers.
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THE NEW SWEDISH PENSION SYSTEM
The new Swedish pension system is intended to achieve a number of goals simultaneously: a permanent stabilization of the pension payroll tax contribution rate, a tighter linkage between contributions and benefits in the social insurance component of pensions, improved incentives to work longer, and a separation of social insurance and income maintenance functions of the pension system. It makes a number of fundamental changes in pensions. 7 The old flat-rate basic pension, which was mostly payroll tax financed but had very 4 See Karen M. Anderson, The Welfare State in the Global Economy, and Palmer, "Swedish Pension Reform," p. 186. 5 The total employer social insurance contribution rate had reached 31.95% by 1990. Sweden, National Social Insurance Board, Social Insurance Expenditure in Sweden 1999 -2002 , Stockholm: National Social Insurance Board, 2002 incentive to work longer in order to receive higher pension benefits.
Redistribution across cohorts and across individuals within cohorts is also supposed to be ended in the income pension system, with each age cohort receiving a total payout from the income pension equal to its contributions plus a return on those contributions tied to economic growth. Each individual within a specific cohort will receive a share of the total "pie" available to their cohort equivalent to their share of total contributions for the cohort. 9 Individuals can begin receiving retirement benefits at any age beginning at 61, with no upper limit. 10 The income pension is financed entirely by a fixed 16 percent payroll tax. It will be operated largely on a Pay-As-Yo u-Go rather than a funded basis, avoiding the double payment problem encountered with trying to move to advanced funding. As in the current system, however, "buffer" funds will help to even out demographic peaks and valleys.
Sweden's new pension system also includes a new "guarantee pension" receivable at age 65 that provides minimum income support for workers with low lifetime earnings. The guarantee pension performs the redistributive functions carried out by the flat rate pension and pension supplement under the old Swedish pension system. It will be financed entirely by general government revenues and income-tested against other public pension income.
In addition to the income pension and guarantee pension, the new system contains what Swedes call a "p remium reserve" pension: of the total 18.5% in pension contributions, 2.5% will be placed in an individual investment account that will operate on a defined contribution basis. accepted reluctantly by Sweden's non-social democratic parties, who wanted to limit the role of the state in the Premium Pension system (and in the economy generally). Special rules imposed on the default fund reflect these concerns : individuals cannot actively opt for the Premium Choice Fund, the Fund is not allowed to market itself to potential "customers", persons who opt out of the default fund are not allowed to opt back in, and the default fund's shares are not to be voted on any issues that companies bring to their shareholders.
Sweden's new pension system is designed to be transparent in that individuals receive an annual statement about the size of their projected pensions from both the income pension and individual account (premium pension) tiers, as well as the guarantee pension, where applicable.
Predicted benefits are given under several different economic scenarios regarding retirement age and overall performance of the Swedish economy. 12 Thus workers are provided with increased information about their future pensions that they can use in making retirement and savings decisions. However, they also face increased uncertainty because their pensions depend on economic and demographic developments over which they have no control.
The transition to the new system will take place over a sixteen year period. Workers born in 1937 and earlier will have their pension benefit determined entirely in the old ATP system, and those born in 1954 and later will be entirely in the new system. In the intermediate group, an increasing share of pension rights will be determined under the new system. 13 Thus current and soon-to-be retirees are protected from cutbacks that will accompany the shift to the new income pension system. But all workers born after 1936 now contribute to the individual account system. A critical set of issues in implementing the new premium pension is how to encourage those contributing to the system to make a choice or multiple choices among funds, and what to do with the contributions of those who did not. Given the staggering array of potential choices facing contributors, Sweden's Premium Pension Authority tries to make at least minimal information about fund choices available to potential contributors. In each round, it has published and sent to new entrants to the system a very detailed booklet on how to go about making fund choices, as well as a fund catalogue listing all funds (broken down into categories and subcategories), a very brief description of each fund, the fund's total capital, fund management charges, fund returns for each of the last five years as well as a total five year return (where applicable), and a measure of fund risk (variability in return over the past three years).
SYSTEM ADMINISTRATION AND COSTS
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CHOICE AND NON CHOICE IN THE INITIAL ROUND
Several recent studies suggest hypotheses about active choice of pension funds when a default option is available. Overall, the factors that are likely to influence whether individuals make an active choice can be divided into two groups, first, characteristics of individuals (e.g., familiarity with financial markets, length of time until retirement, gender) and second, characteristics of the choice situation (e.g., desirability of the default option, complexity and information costs associated with active choice, availability of information and "priming" to Data from the first five rounds of PPM choice facilitate an assessment of these hypotheses. It should be noted at the outset that interest in the first round of PPM choice in the fall of 2000 was unusually high, in part because the amounts of money were relatively large, since four years of accrued contributions (for 1995-1998) were to be placed. Moreover, a substantial media campaign was mounted not only by the government's new Premium Pension Authority (PPM), but also by many fund companies, calculating that once individuals had made their choices, they were likely to stick with them. Nevertheless, only about two-thirds of those eligible to choose a fund in the initial round in the fall of 2000 did so.
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Initial data released by PPM found that women were slightly more likely than men to make an active choice in 2000. There was also somewhat less active choice among the youngest (18-22) and oldest (58-62) groups, who presumably felt the least stake in making an active fund choice-the former because of their long time until retirement and the latter because their total fund size will be small and not a substantial part of their retirement pension. Nevertheless, rates of active choice among these groups were close to 60 percent in the 2000 round. A recent study by Engström and Westerberg, matching Swedish government data with records from the initial round of PPM pension fund choice, provides a rich body of data to examine hypotheses about which sub-groups are more and less likely to make an active pension fund choice. Using a multiple logit regression analysis that allows the effects of different causal factors to be assessed independently, Engström and Westerberg find that a number of factors dramatically (odds ratio of more than 1.30) increased the odds that a group would make an active choice in the 2000 round relative to the "reference group" of single, Swedish-born men with education only up to the compulsory level. These factors include employment in the financial services sector and having substantial private pension savings (both related to prior experience in financial markets) and being married. Other factors increased the odds ratio for active choice less substantially (odds ratio between 1.10 and 1.29), including more advanced education, higher income, and female gender. Controlling for other factors that make active choice more likely (notably marriage, children and financial market experience), Engström and Westerberg find that being relatively young (18-32) also modestly increases active choice.
Two factors-proximity to retirement (age 58-62) and having been born in a non-Nordic country-decrease the odds ratio relative to the reference group by more than forty percent (odds below 0.60). The sharp drop-off in fund choice among those born in non-Nordic countries is very likely related to the fact that many PPM materials, including fund catalogues, were available only in Swedish. Upper middle age (53-57) and birth in a Nordic country other than Sweden lower the odds of active choice (odds ratio between 0.80 and 0.90) significantly. If the skewed age distribution of new labor market entrants, small stakes, and large number of choices made relatively modest independent contributions to the drop-off in active choice after 2000, the interaction of these factors with several additional factors that affected new entrants' choice situation almost certainly had a greater impact. A fourth factor that was particularly important was the absence of a "contagion effect" that was present in the initial round of fund choice, since it involved the vast majority of adults in Swedish society under the age of 65, and was widely discussed among families and friends. The much smaller cohorts entering in later years did not experience this effect.
Fifth, while the PPM mounted substantial outreach and media campaigns in each round, and tried to increase internet accessibility for making choices, the fund companies, recognizing both the small sums at stake and the very broad field of funds available, did not mount substantial campaigns in later rounds as they had in 2000. 26 Table 2 demanded by PPM, the incentives for a major marketing campaign by fund managersespecially for individual funds rather than the overall "family" of funds operated by a fund management company-were very small indeed. The media also paid much less attention to pension fund choice in the rounds held after 2000. These trends are evident in Table 3, which shows results from PPM's post-choice survey of new system entrants in each of the first four rounds. There is a dramatic decline across the board in the number of information sources that are cited by survey respondents as having been used in making their decision on how to invest their premium pension funds, reflecting an overall decline in active choice. But the declines are particularly striking in the categories for friends and acquaintances, fund providers (banks, insurance companies, fund managers) and the media, reflecting the decline in media attention, fund promotion and informal "contagion" from the first round. In the 2003 post choice survey, respondents report extremely low levels of contacts initiated by fund providers.
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Sixth, the widespread publicity given to the negative returns experienced by most wanting to be spared making a choice right now, or not having the energy or wanting to choose.
These reasons are in the aggregate similar to those given by survey respondents who say that they did not make an active choice of funds rather than actively preferring the 7 th AP Fund (Figure 2 ).
PATTERNS OF CHOICE AND RISK AMONG ACTIVE CHOOSERS
The timing of implementation of the new Premium Pension system was unfortunate, (Table 5) . However, these trends among active users have been overwhelmed in their effects by the shift away from active choice toward passive investment in the equities-heavy Seventh AP default fund, which essentially functions as a global equities fund.
A potentially more serious problem is that a small minority of active choosers appears to be over-concentrated in high-risk funds with high recent returns, despite the high risk generally associated with such investments. Choosers in the initial 2000 round invested heavily in tech funds, since those showed the highest rates of return in the Fund Catalogues they received from the Premium Pension Authority (PPM The experience of the Seventh AP Fund clearly shows that there is likely to be a tension in any default fund between the objective of preserving capital and that of "having as good a pens ion as others," which over the long term requires substantial investments in higher yielding equity investments. To achieve the latter objective, The Seventh Pension AP Fund set an investment time horizon of 25 years for its Premium Saving Fund, and an initial portfolio allocation of 65 percent foreign equities, 20 percent Swedish equities, and 14 percent Kingdom of Sweden inflation linked bonds. This initial portfolio was later changed to 90 percent in equities.
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The Swedish experience with the premium pension also suggests that a default fund may also become involved in debates over domestic, ethical and environmental investment practices.
Indeed, the 7 th AP Fund took an even more aggressive stand on these issues than the other state pension funds, in part because it is not allowed to vote its shares. It instead decided to disinvest in companies that had been found guilty by impartial tribunals of violating international conventions to which Sweden had adhered, including conventions on human rights, child labor, 
CHALLENGES FOR THE SWEDISH INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT SYSTEM
The most important challenge for the Swedish premium pension system is how to engage new labor market entrants in the premium pension process at an early point. One can argue that these workers are being rational in "choosing" the default fund in overwhelming numbers, since it has outperformed the weighted index of actively chosen PPM funds. But failure to engage young workers undercuts the legitimacy of the new pension system. It also raises concerns among non-socialists about the huge size of the state-affiliated default fund as those workers increase their earnings. Engaging young workers is likely to remain very difficult, however, so long as private fund managers limit their marketing activities, the vast majority of account holders suffer losses, and the default fund continues to outperform the fund index as a whole.
And so long as the PPM is required to pass on the costs of engagement activities to current depositors in the form of higher management fees, there will be strong incentives to limit those efforts. Indeed, the PPM has in recent rounds scaled back its public information campaigns to engage new workers, and its has called for additional government help in educating future contributors-for example by including consumer finance education in school curricula. That is the crucial security for me as a pensioner." 45 The head of the Seventh AP-Fund, which administers the default fund for non-choosers, has vigorously defended current investment practices as necessary to protect the value of future pensions. 46 Rules on ethical and environmental criteria for investments are also likely to remain contentious.
LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
Sweden offers a number of lessons about the issues that need to be anticipated in designing and implementing an individual account scheme that would be relevant if the United 47 Another potential set of lessons relates to annuitization requirements, survivor benefits, inheritability of fund assets and other aspects of fund payout, but these are beyond the scope of the present paper.
The Swedish model offers a number of lessons concerning the advantages and disadvantages of having a strong state agency role in administration of assets. Some of the advantages and disadvantages of this approach are clear. On the plus side, centralized administration minimizes the additional paperwork burden for employers, who can follow existing procedures for submitting payroll taxes and do not need to get involved in administering fund choices and payments to multiple funds by their employees. Thus it almost certainly weakens opposition from employers-especially small employers-to adoption of a system of mandatory retirement savings accounts. Central administration of funds also makes it easier to permit very wide fund choice and to negotiate reductions in management fees by fund providers.
On the negative side, use of the tax system to collect funds also contributes to a very long lag time in crediting of individual pension accounts. In Sweden, moreover, integration of the system with payroll tax records on an annual basis has also meant that these investments are placed into the market in very large annual lumps that could potentially disrupt bond and foreign exchange markets. 48 This would be even more problematic in placing the enormous sums that would be involved with contributions from a country the size of the United States.
There are also issues of generational equity for the first generation of contributors to a centralized system. When government chooses to pass on the costs of the centralized management agency (PPM) and default fund to contributors, as has been done in Sweden, rather than paying them out of the general budget, the fixed costs of establishing and operating such a system are borne disproportionately by the initial contributors, because the system has a relatively small number of contributors and small asset base of contribut ions. In Sweden, the government made loans to both PPM and the Seventh AP Fund to cover these costs, which are being repaid over a long period. Nevertheless, the management costs per krona of contribution assets are much higher in the initial period. In addition, the high costs of engaging new entrants after the initial round are, under the current Swedish system, unfairly borne by current depositors in the form of higher PPM operating expenses.
U.S. policymakers, operating in a very different political environment, might want to consider a different model if a centralized management agency were to be established here.
First, it would be politically more acceptable in the United States to pay all of the capital and operating costs (including advertising costs to engage new participants) of a central "clearinghouse" agency out of the general government budget rather than as a charge on contributions. Second, given what has turned out to be the relatively limited within-year level of fund changing activity in Sweden, as well as the close integration of account management and reporting functions with the roles performed by the Social Security Administration in the United
States, it might make more sense to keep management of individual accounts within SSA, under the jurisdiction of a new bureau established for that purpose, rather than creating a new separate agency as has been done in Sweden with the PPM. The main risk of such an approach is that it could lead to pressure on local SSA offices to deliver services that they are not set up to deliver (e.g., helping people make fund changes at a time of financial panic) as well as services that it would be inappropriate for them to provide at all (advice on choice of individual funds). If account management were retained within SSA, very clear messages would have to be conveyed to the public that fund-switching services were only available through other mechanisms (e.g., mail, phone and internet) and that no advice on choice of individual funds can be provided by SSA. This would require a major-and ongoing-campaign of public information. But some misunderstanding is almost inevitable, and it could be damaging to the agency's image and morale. If, on the other hand, a new separate agency was established as a clearinghouse for individual accounts, it would be essential to maintain close cooperation and compatibility of data systems between that agency and SSA.
Swedish experience also suggests that it takes a long lead time to get a new central administrative organization up and running. The information technology requirements for such a system are especially daunting. Indeed, Sweden's scheme had to be delayed in order to make sure that the technology would work, and the PPM ended up having to pay more than $25 million dollars for a computer system that it never used after cancelling a contract with the system's vendor. 49 The propensity of Congress to demand immediate action once they have decided on an action is a well-documented feature of American policymaking, 50 and one that could have very negative consequences both in the short term and in the long term (by undermining public confidence in the system and the willingness of fund managers to participate) if it caused serious implementation problems in a new individual account program.
Entry Barriers for Fund Providers
Swedish experience suggests that it is possible to get a large number of fund providers to participate in a state administered individual account system even when substantial rebates are required. Indeed, the Swedish experience suggests that the number of choices in an individual account system can be very high-and grow over time-unless gatekeepers impose meaningful entry barriers. The number of choices in the Swedish system is almost certainly so high that it discourages active choice by overwhelming potential advisors who, especially in later rounds, are mostly young, unsophisticated in investing, and do not perceive a strong interest in fund choices. Rather than the Swedish system of relatively open entry by individual funds, it might make more sense in the United States to offer a much smaller range of "generic" funds-perhaps ten to twenty-that offer investors a range of choices in terms of equities versus fixed return investments, domestic versus international exposure, etc. In order to prevent the size of individual pools of capital, each fund option could be contracted out to multiple fund managers, with recipients receiving a rate of return that was the weighted average across all of those fund pools. Of course, moving away from having the government pension authority acting primarily as certifier of fund options to picking fund managers does raise difficult issues for the body doing the picking, since the fees generated for fund providers will presumably be very large. The federal government's Thrift Savings Plan has managed these issues with little controversy, but the stakes in a society-wide individual account scheme will of course be much greater.
Limiting Risk
In addition to limiting the number of funds that savers in an individual account system can choose, Swedish experience suggests that some constraints on the content of fund options may be appropriate in an individual account system. The ten worst performing funds in the first year of the Swedish premium pension-all stock funds with a technology focus-lost a staggering average of 76.6 percent of their value. 51 While most investors probably did not put all their funds into such funds, there were no legal constraints on doing so. Similar issues arise with regional equity funds in the Swedish system, notably funds focused on Eastern Europe. The U.S.
economy is diverse enough, and U.S. equity markets are sufficiently developed and transparent to make a U.S.-only diversified equity fund a reasonable retirement savings vehicle. But this is not true of many developing markets. Even in a system that permits a broad range of funds, policymakers may want to consider restrictions on overly specialized funds. Limitations on 51 Svensson, "PPMs första år."
sector-specific as well as country-and region-specific funds are particularly important if fund choices are limited to a relatively narrow range of options.
Engaging Workers in Fund Choice
A fourth set of lessons for the United States that is clearly highlighted by the Swedish experience with individual accounts concerns the need to think through how to engage new workers in choosing a fund. The 2.5 percent of earnings contributed by Swedish workers translates into relatively small absolute amounts for young workers, who may not perceive themselves as having a real stake in making a choice. The sums being debated in most U.S.
proposals for Social Security reform are of similar magnitude. Neither strong media efforts by the Premium Pension Authority nor efforts to make choice as easy as possible have yet overcome barriers to participation in Sweden, especially after the first round of choice when media attention was highest and virtually the whole labor force faced the need to make a choice simultaneously. Similar problems would likely surface in the United States, where a population thirty times greater than in Sweden would seem likely to increase fund managers' willingness to spend money to market their plans-were it not for the fact that marketing costs in the much larger U.S. ma rket are also dramatically higher than in Sweden.
Swedish evidence from the Engström and Westerberg study also suggests that there is likely to be a substantial gap in active choice between native English speakers and those with another first language. Promoting active choice in the United States would likely require government efforts to provide materials in languages other than English. Fund managers might not see advantages in providing these materials themselves, especially if low entry barriers meant that there were a large number of funds competing in relatively small (and frequently lowincome) niches.
Continuing Communications Obligation
Use of a centrally-administered system of individual accounts carries with it a continuing moral, if not legal, obligation on the part of the administering agency to keep account holders informed of important developments in the specific funds they have chosen after they have made their fund selections. This is particular true when (as in the Swedish case) individual fund managers do not know which individuals in the mandatory individual account system hold their funds, and they do not have a mechanism to communicate directly with fund shareholders.
The Swedish experience suggests that two situations in particular are likely to require communication with those holding specific funds. One is when fund managers raise administrative fees for specific funds. In 2004, for example, Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken increased fees on its money-losing PPM generation funds from 0.5 to 1.2 percent. The 71,000
fund holders received an initial letter from PPM that informed them that fees were being raised and a follow-up letter with more details. But critics have charged that in a system in which most account holders do not pay close attention to their accounts after making their initial selection, there is a significant temptation for fund managers to raise fees after an initial round that enrols all current labor market participants in order to boost profits.
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A second situation in which ongoing communications capacity with account holders is important is when a fund manager decides, for whatever reason, to wind up a fund or withdraw it from the state system. This has happened only a few times in the PPM system. Account holders are notified by PPM and told how to move their funds to another fund. If they do not do so, their funds are moved to the 7th AP Fund's default fund.
As these cases suggest, a continuing capacity for the administering agency to communicate with account ho lders in a timely fashion is essential to the effective operation of a centrally administered fund. Also essential, however, are policies to govern when that 
A Default Fund
The Swedish experience clearly suggests the importance of a default fund for nonchoosers in any centrally-administered system of mandatory individual accounts. Swedish There is no obvious "correct" answer to the growth-versus-security trade-off, but it is probably best to offer different defaults for younger and older workers, and to progressively move the funds of older "abstaining" workers into more secure investments. Indeed, the Swedish Seventh State Pension Fund, which operates the default option for Swedish "abstainers," is now considering creation of "generation funds" that will have different portfolios for different age groups of abstainers. Implementing such a system will require further approvals from the Swedish government, however. 53 U.S. policymakers might also want to consider completely different alternatives, such as placing abstainers' contributions in a pool of funds that represents the average of all choices for persons in their age group.
If a government-operated default fund were to be set up as part of an individual account tier in the United States, Swedish experience also suggests that it would not be free of controversies over environmental, ethical and domestic investment criteria. Of course, such criteria wo uld not necessarily be adopted in a political system that is much more conservative than Sweden's-or there might be pressures for a different set of criteria. 
CONCLUSIONS
The issues outlined here are far from exhaustive. Many other issues would clearly have to be resolved in design of a centrally-managed system of individual retirement savings accounts.
For example, how many different funds should individuals be allowed to choose? (Sweden currently allows five, but there have been discussions of allowing an increase to ten).
Care should also be taken in extrapolating from Swedish experience to other national contexts. Decisions on many design issues-e.g., whether to erect meaningful entry barriers for funds, and whether and how to impose diversificatio n requirements? would have to be made in any system of mandatory individual accounts. But the behavioral responses by pension savers observed in Sweden might not be repeated exactly in the United States or other countries. Those responses reflect both characteristics of specific economies and societies and specific choices made in the design of a retirement income system. For example, if a larger share of pension contributions were directed into the individual account tier than in Sweden, it is possible that rates of active choice might be higher, and fewer persons might concentrate their contributions in high-risk investments. The Swedish evidence nevertheless suggests that both the design choices and administrative challenges associated with a centrally-ma naged system of individual retirement savings accounts are considerable. Answer to the question asked of all survey respondents: "which of the following information sources have you used to help with how your premium pension should be invested?" Answers total more than 100 percent because more than one answer was possible. The "school" alternative answer was missing in 2000 and 2001, as was "social insurance office" and "other web sites" in 2000 and "work colleagues" in 2001. In 2000, "PPM's web site" was formulated as "Internet" and "work colleagues" as "work." 
